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Trustworthy Commodity Computation and Communication 
Perform research into design 
of secure integrated core 
architectures for trustworthy 




Hardware, SecureCore Least 
Privilege Separation Kernel, 
SecureCore Security Services, 
and secure communications 
( For use in resource-constrained, ubiquitous 
computing platform s, i.e. secure embedded 
t.._systems and mobile computing devices 
:secs 




Comparison to state-of-the-art 
Current approach 
ad hoc revocation mechanisms 
temporal policies lack low level support 
VMs provide no sharing 
New Approach to 
• revocation 
• temporal access control 
• read down from VM 
trusted subjects all or nothing • modeling & assured control of trusted subjects 
isolated design of layers • codesign of HW/Kernel/Services 
security with coprocessor • unified processor 
Technical Summary 
Anticipated te-chnlcal advances 
Kernel·based fine grain control of trusted subjects 
A trusted subject may only access certain objects in its trust range - minimizes reliance on the correctness or applkatlon~domaln security services 
Formal model and architectural solution define "'controlled interfe rence'"for trusted subjects. 
Subjects can "read down" to blocks at lower levels. as allowed by kernel 
Also, kernel<ontrolled controlled write up ("blind'write) 
TradltkJnal separation kernel architectures lac:k these abilities 
Exponation of hardware Interrupts to the client OS 
Enables OS specific Interrupt handling regarding subjects' access violations to individual resources 
Tradltional oeparatlon kernel architectures only provide block·level notifKation 
Kernel·based •intransitive Information flow' enforcement 
Traditionally requires trusted subjects 
SecureCore supports, for ex"mple,a policy whereby each subject may only read down one level, becauoe of data lnteg~ty or system assurance concerns. 
Innovation 
ur ization of hardware/l<ernel/SCSS co design to construc1 SCSS in1erfac:e such that SecureCore unique ~urily features do not require modifications to the client OS. 
Recent Developrn.nu 
Hardware and soflware architecture and authorization model to suppon temporal access controls 
Hardware and soflware mechanisms to suppon objec1 reuse requirements 
Re examination and synthe~s of ~urity principles relative to current technology trends and target platform 
National Science found,uion 
WHE•E DI SCO VERIES BEGI N 
NSF Cyber Trust Annual Principal Investigator Meeting 
Sept. 25 - 27th, 2005 
Newport Beach, California Information Sciences Institute 
NAVAL 
POSTGRADUAH 
SCHOOL 
